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INTRODUCTION 
James Madison once declared that laws impairing the obligation 
of contracts were contrary to the central role of government—namely, 
appropriate legislative reach.1 Such a view took hold in early America, 
particularly with the United States Supreme Court, because Court 
decisions upholding the Contracts Clause were responsible for nearly 
half of state laws deemed unconstitutional by 1890.2 However, the 
Great Depression and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New 
Deal in the early twentieth century proved to be the end for the 
commonality of Contracts Clause claims.3 Accordingly, the Court’s 
decision to grant certiorari in Sveen v. Melin in 2018 shocked 
constitutional law pundits because it was the first case to implicate the 
Contracts Clause in over twenty-five years.4  
 
 1. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison) (“[L]aws impairing the 
obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and 
to every principle of sound legislation.”); see also Robert B. Reich, What Happened 
to the American Social Compact, 50 ME. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (explaining every society 
and culture possesses a social compact that is usually both explicit and implicit and 
designed to define the obligations of each member in relation to each other). The 
Contracts Clause maintains “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 2. See Nick Sibilla, The Supreme Court Abandons Another Constitutional 
Safeguard, Only Gorsuch Dissents, FORBES (June 12, 2018, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2018/06/12/the-supreme-court-
abandons-another-constitutional-safeguard-only-gorsuch-dissents/#1120ab5f1f80 
[https://perma.cc/U7DS-UJ8T] (discussing the once prominent role of the Contracts 
Clause in ruling state legislation unconstitutional). 
 3. See Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original 
Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 459–60 (2001) 
(discussing how the traditional conception of the New Deal’s successes was attributed 
to striking down pre-1937 doctrines and the avoidance of a court packing plan 
proposed by the Roosevelt Administration); see also Sibilla, supra note 2 (“[L]ike far 
too many other constitutional provisions, the Contracts Clause was largely gutted 
during the New Deal and became moribund.”). 
 4. See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1820 (2018) (explaining that the 
statute at issue differed from its predecessor statute in that divorce now operates as a 
termination of a beneficiary designation, rather than assuming a divorce allows the 
beneficiary designation to continue); see also Wystan Ackerman, Sveen v. Melin: 
Supreme Court Speaks on the Contracts Clause, ROBINSON + COLE (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.classactionsinsider.com/2018/06/sveen-v-melin-supreme-court-speaks-
on-the-contracts-clause/ [https://perma.cc/DHH5-G2MT] (“After a decades-long 
drought, the Supreme Court recently decided a case involving the Contracts Clause of 
the Constitution. You might not recall that provision because it is so rarely invoked in 
modern-day litigation . . . .”); Donald Scarinci, Sveen v Melin Is First Contracts 
Clause Case in Decades, CONST. L. REP., https://constitutionallawreporter.com/ 
2018/09/05/sveen-v-melin-2018/ [https://perma.cc/4LZY-KUVN] (last visited Mar. 
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The source of the dispute in Sveen was a Minnesota revocation-
on-divorce statute.5 The statute maintains that divorce by operation of 
law will terminate any devise of property, including a beneficiary 
designation.6 In Sveen, the relevant contract was a life insurance policy 
Sveen purchased naming his wife as beneficiary and his two children 
as contingent beneficiaries.7 Sveen’s failure to revise his life insurance 
policy to reflect his divorce prior to his death prompted the litigation.8 
The Sveen children argued that the revocation-on-divorce statute 
voided the ex-wife’s interest in the insurance policy.9 In opposition, 
Sveen’s ex-wife maintained that the statute did not exist upon 
formation of the contract and would violate the Contracts Clause in 
the Constitution if applied.10  
The significance of the Court granting certiorari in Sveen does 
not turn on its holding but its status as the first case to implicate the 
Contracts Clause in more than twenty-five years.11 The Court’s 
willingness to conduct its analysis using the Contracts Clause presents 
an opportunity to resolve additional circuit splits implicating the 
 
16, 2020) (“The Supreme Court addressed the Constitution’s Contracts Clause for the 
first time in 25 years in Sveen v Melin . . . .”); see also Sibilla, supra note 2 (explaining 
Sveen v. Melin was the first case analyzed under the Contracts Clause in twenty-five 
years). 
 5. See Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1820 (discussing divorce courts’ broad discretion 
in dividing marital property). 
 6. See id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 524.2-804 (2016)) (“Enacted in 2002 to 
track the Code, the law provides that ‘the dissolution or annulment of a marriage 
revokes any revocable[] disposition, beneficiary designation, or appointment of 
property made by an individual to the individual’s former spouse in a governing 
instrument.’”). 
 7. See id. at 1821 (noting that Mark Sveen’s children, who were named as 
contingent beneficiaries, were from a previous marriage). 
 8. See id. (“The divorce decree made no mention of the insurance policy. 
And Sveen took no action, then or later, to revise his beneficiary designations.”). 
 9. See id. (discussing the Sveen children’s argument). 
 10. See id. (“Melin notes in reply that the Minnesota law did not yet exist 
when her former husband bought his insurance policy and named her as the primary 
beneficiary.”). 
 11. See Scarinci, supra note 4 (explaining the Contracts Clause had not been 
plead in a Supreme Court case for twenty-five years). The Supreme Court held that 
retroactive application of the revocation-on-divorce statute did not violate the 
Contracts Clause. See Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1821 (discussing the reversal of the Court 
of Appeals decision in favor of the ex-wife). The last Supreme Court case prior to 
Sveen to implicate the Contracts Clause was General Motors Corp. v. Romein, which 
involved workers’ compensation benefits withheld by General Motors Corporation 
and Ford Motor Company under a Michigan workers’ compensation statute. See 503 
U.S. 181, 183 (1992) (explaining petitioners challenged the workers’ compensation 
statute based on its ex post facto application violating the Contracts Clause). 
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Contracts Clause.12 A decades-long debate exists concerning whether 
a Contracts Clause claim is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a 
statute providing a cause of action when an individual acting “under 
color of” state law or custom deprives federally protected rights.13  
The Contracts Clause ensures that the several states do not 
impair a private citizen’s right to contract.14 Despite its presence in the 
Constitution, the prohibition applies only to the states, not the federal 
government.15 The Court has set forth a two-part test to determine 
whether a law violates the Contracts Clause when state action 
retroactively modifies a contract.16 The initial determination is 
whether the state action has “substantially impaired” a contractual 
relationship.17 The degree of impairment has a direct relationship to 
 
 12. See Sheldon Nahmod, Are Contract Clause Violations Actionable Under 
Section 1983? A Circuit Split, NAHMOD L. (Apr. 4, 2018, 10:41 AM), 
https://nahmodlaw.com/2018/04/04/are-contract-clause-violations-actionable-under-
section-1983-a-circuit-split/ [https://perma.cc/7VPP-PCUB] (“[T]here is no 
persuasive reason to exclude Contract Clause violations from the ‘deprivation of any 
rights . . . secured by the Constitution’ language of §1983 itself.”). 
 13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress 
. . . .”); Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1828 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing how many 
critics have questioned the Court’s departure from the plain text of the Contracts 
Clause and how their views deserve to be analyzed in a future case). 
 14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (guaranteeing the individual’s freedom 
of contract). 
 15. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray, 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984) 
(“We have never held, however, that the principles embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause are coextensive with prohibitions existing against 
state impairments of pre-existing contracts.”); Charlotte Simon, The (In)applicability 
of the Contracts Clause to the Federal Government, LEARNING CONST. L. (Mar. 8, 
2009, 8:35 PM), https://learningconlaw.wordpress.com/2009/03/08/the-
inapplicability-of-the-contracts-clause-to-the-federal-government/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2D8G-QZPB] (discussing the Gray case). 
 16. See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 
411–12 (1983) (describing the two-part test used to analyze Contracts Clause claims). 
 17. See id. (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 
244 (1978)) (“The threshold inquiry is ‘whether the state law has, in fact, operated as 
a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.’”); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 
U.S. 516, 531 (1982) (explaining that a state statute requiring a party to preserve their 
contract rights and obligations is not a substantial impairment); U.S. Tr. Co. v. New 
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1977) (explaining that substantial impairment does not 
require total destruction of the contract); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 
515 (1965) (explaining that a state regulation limiting a contractual party’s 
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the level of scrutiny applied to the state law or action.18 If the Court 
determines a state law or action constitutes a substantial impairment, 
it then considers whether such law or action is a reasonable and 
appropriate means of furthering a significant and legitimate public 
purpose.19  
Courts have also made clear that the two-part test differs when 
evaluating private and public contracts.20 Namely, when the Contracts 
Clause violation involves a public contract, the Court augments the 
second part of the analysis to require the state to justify its approach.21 
Public contracts receive a heightened standard of review because the 
state is self-interested in the terms of the contract.22 Despite the 
enhanced standard of review for public contracts, state law or action 
affecting private contracts historically comports with the Court’s 
Contracts Clause jurisprudence.23 
 
“reasonably . . . expected” financial gains is not per se a substantial impairment). 
Justice Gorsuch criticized the two-part test in Sveen v. Melin for substantially 
departing from the plain text of the Contracts Clause, which prohibits any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts. See Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1827 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution does not speak of ‘substantial’ impairments—it bars 
‘any’ impairment.”).  
 18. See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc., 459 U.S. at 411 (citing Allied Structural 
Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 245) (“The severity of the impairment is said to increase the 
level of scrutiny to which the legislation will be subjected.”). 
 19. See id. at 411–12 (citing U.S. Tr. Co., 431 U.S. at 22) (“If the state 
regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the State, in justification, must have a 
significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, . . . such as the 
remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem.”). 
 20. See U.S. Tr. Co., 431 U.S. at 25–26 (“In applying this standard . . . 
[involving a public contract], . . . complete deference to a legislative assessment of 
reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate . . . .”). 
 21. See id. (explaining the Contracts Clause analysis is augmented due to the 
government’s self-interest); Barbara A. Cherry & Steven S. Wildman, Preventing 
Flawed Communication Policies by Addressing Constitutional Principles, 2000 L. 
REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 55, 82 (“Thus, with public contracts the court will also 
address questions such as: (1) was a more moderate approach available?; and (2) was 
the state action reasonable in light of surrounding circumstances?”). 
 22. See U.S. Tr. Co., 431 U.S. at 26; Stephen F. Belfort, Unilateral Alteration 
of Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Contract Clause, 59 BUFF. 
L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2011) (explaining that after nearly a half-century of deferring to the 
constitutionality of state legislation, the Court placed a heightened standard of review 
on state impairment of public contracts). 
 23. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc., 459 U.S. at 416 (upholding a 
Kansas statute placing a limit on natural gas sales as consistent with the Contracts 
Clause); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196 (1983) (upholding an Alabama 
severance tax on oil and gas as consistent with the Contracts Clause). But see, e.g., 
Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 250 (explaining a Minnesota statute imposing 
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Because of myriad procedural and substantive advantages, such 
as the availability of attorney’s fees for prevailing plaintiffs and the 
potential for a longer statute of limitations,24 plaintiffs seek to state a 
cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.25 This Note provides 
reasons as to why the Supreme Court should settle the decades-long 
circuit split concerning Contracts Clause claims under § 1983.26 
Because the goal of the private party and the state is to protect 
individual health and welfare, the Court should make evident that the 
freedom of contract and state police power can coincide 
harmoniously.27  
Part I of this Note discusses the historical evolution and purpose 
of the Contracts Clause. Part I also discusses the origins of § 1983, 
including the Court’s jurisprudence concerning what constitutional 
provisions historically allow for a cause of action.28 Part II considers 
the Court’s decision under § 1983’s predecessor statute and how 
appellate courts have extended or declined to extend a cause of action 
under § 1983 for a Contracts Clause claim.29 Part II further analyzes 
 
a fee for termination of a pension impermissibly affected a private contract in violation 
of the Contracts Clause). 
 24. See Jack M. Beermann, Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties Under 
Section 1983?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 9, 13–14 (2004) (discussing the reasons why 
plaintiffs use § 1983 to sue public officials). 
 25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (providing a cause of action for state 
deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution); see e.g., 
Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 341 (6th Cir. 2017) (discussing retirees’ decision 
to bring suit under § 1983); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 637–38 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (describing plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 
336 F.3d 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the availability of attorney’s fees under 
§ 1983). One important area of litigation that would be affected if the Court were to 
rule that § 1983 provides a cause of action for a violation of the Contracts Clause is 
state pension reform laws. See Alexander Volokh, The Revival of the Contract Clause, 
REASON FOUND. (Sept. 25, 2013), https://reason.org/commentary/pensions-contract-
clause/ [https://perma.cc/7AG8-M9SH]. Many public employees make the argument 
that their pension plans were included as a part of their signed employment contracts 
and bring suit under the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. See id. 
 26. See infra Part III (discussing the need to establish a proper balance 
between state police power, a clear standard of review, and the scope of § 1983). 
 27. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND 
DEFENSES § 3.03 (4th ed. 2018) (arguing that the Contracts Clause is enforceable 
under § 1983). 
 28. See infra Part I (discussing the historical evolution of § 1983 and the 
Contracts Clause); see also Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 345–47 (describing the judicial 
history of § 1983 and the Contracts Clause). 
 29. See infra Part II (discussing the Court’s interpretation of § 1983’s 
predecessor statute and how federal appellate courts have interpreted the decision to 
provide or withhold a cause of action for a violation of the Contracts Clause); see also 
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what factors led to each court’s respective decision.30 Finally, Part III 
recommends a resolution of the various appeals court decisions and 
offers various policy justifications that demonstrate the need for a § 
1983 cause of action for a Contracts Clause violation.31  
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE AND     
§ 1983 
To better understand the court of appeals’ decisions, one must 
survey the history of both the Contracts Clause and § 1983.32 The 
Contracts Clause was once the most litigated constitutional provision; 
today, however, the provision is unlikely to receive extensive 
treatment in the curriculum for a first-year law student enrolled in 
Constitutional Law.33 The primary reason for the relative absence of 
contemporary Contracts Clause litigation is the Court’s departure 
from enforcing broad and plenary individual contract rights to a 
consistent favoring of state police power and states’ ability to respond 
to exigent circumstances.34 Constitutional provisions are commonly 
enforced when parties bring an action against a state actor under § 
1983.35 The Court provided a two-part test for an individual to make 
 
Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 323 (1885) (holding that § 1983’s predecessor 
statute did not provide a cause of action for a violation of the Contracts Clause). 
 30. See infra Part II (explaining the reasons each court of appeals offered for 
deciding a cause of action existed under § 1983 for a Contracts Clause claim). 
 31. See infra Part III (discussing the policy concerns that could potentially be 
rectified if the Court finds a cause of action under § 1983 for a Contracts Clause 
violation); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) 
(discussing the inconsistency in the application of municipal liability under state and 
federal law); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56–57 (1905) (establishing a quasi-
strict scrutiny standard of review). 
 32. See infra Section I.A (discussing the historical evolution of the Contracts 
Clause); Section I.B (discussing the historical background and development of § 
1983); see also Alan W. Clarke, The Ku Klux Klan Act and the Civil Rights 
Revolution: How Civil Rights Litigation Came to Regulate Police and Correctional 
Officer Misconduct, 7 SCHOLAR 151, 152–53 (2005); James W. Ely Jr., Whatever 
Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 371, 371–72 (2010) 
(discussing the once important nature of the Contracts Clause and its gradual decline 
throughout the twentieth century). 
 33. See Ely, supra note 32, at 371 (explaining that when the author was 
discussing his project with his potential research assistant the student did not 
recognize what the Contracts Clause was). 
 34. See id. at 387–90 (discussing the genesis of the Court’s movement away 
from consistently enforcing the Contracts Clause in favor of private parties). 
 35. See Beermann, supra note 24, at 9 (explaining that claimants bring § 1983 
actions against the government and not private entities). 
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out a cause of action under § 1983, and meeting it has several 
substantive and procedural advantages.36 
A. The History and Evolution of the Contracts Clause 
The Contracts Clause of the Constitution maintains that “[n]o 
state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.”37 The policy behind the Contracts Clause is rooted in 
efficiency, promotion of commerce, and preventing interference on 
the part of the several states with regard to preexisting contractual 
agreements.38 Elsewhere, the Court has afforded the right to contract 
protection as an individual liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.39 
The Court has interpreted the right to contract as so entrenched in 
individualism that certain government actions infringing the 
individual right to contract entitle that individual to some form of a 
hearing.40 Nevertheless, at its inception, the Contracts Clause did not 
serve as an all-powerful constitutional safeguard protecting the overall 
freedom of contract.41 While constitutional provisions have afforded 
 
 36. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (“Our cases 
have accordingly insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a 
federal right be fairly attributable to the State. These cases reflect a two-part approach 
to this question of ‘fair attribution.’”); see also Beermann, supra note 24, at 13–14 
(surveying the procedural and substantive advantages of bringing suit under § 1983). 
 37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (securing the freedom of contract). 
 38. See Cherry & Wildman, supra note 21, at 81 (citing Leo Clarke, The 
Contract Clause: A Basis for Limited Judicial Review of State Economic Regulation, 
39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 186 (1985)) (“Contract rights deserve special protection 
because they are perhaps the one property interest that is most closely related to 
allocative efficiency and the growth of commerce.”); see also 16B AM. JUR. 2D 
Constitutional Law § 754 (2d ed. 2018) (“The larger purpose is to encourage trade 
and credit by promoting confidence in the stability of contractual obligations, 
generally.”). 
 39. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (“While this [C]ourt has not attempted to define 
with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term 
has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely 
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also 
the right of the individual to contract . . . .”); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
593, 602 (1972) (discussing how even those contracts that are formed on an implied 
basis can be afforded protection as a property interest recognized by state law). 
 40. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70 (“The requirements of procedural due 
process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. When protected interests are 
implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.”). 
 41. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 262 (1827) (explaining that the 
Contracts Clause prevents laws from retroactively affecting contracts, but not those 
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great protection to an individual’s right to contract, since the early 
twentieth century, state interference with preexisting individual 
contract rights have often bowed to state police power.42 The Contracts 
Clause historically has not provided absolute protection for the 
freedom of contract when countervailing concerns of health, safety, 
and morals are at stake.43  
To say freedom of contract was a largely safeguarded and 
litigated provision of the Constitution prior to and into the early 
twentieth century would be an understatement.44 The Court once 
opined that the Contracts Clause has done more than any other 
constitutional provision to protect the administration of justice.45 Both 
conservative and progressive scholars agree that the most significant 
and controversial decision favoring an individual’s right to contract 
over the state’s police power came in Lochner v. New York.46 In 
Lochner, the Court struck down a law intended to protect the safety of 
workers in favor of freedom of contract principles.47 The Lochner 
 
that prospectively affect contracts); see also David E. Bernstein, Freedom of Contract 
1 (Geo. Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-51, 
2008) [hereinafter Bernstein, Freedom of Contract]. 
 42. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 
502–03 (1987) (discussing that the Contracts Clause is not read based on its plain 
text); Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 
(1983); see also Cherry & Wildman, supra note 21, at 81–82 (discussing the limits 
imposed on the Contracts Clause). 
 43. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444–45 (1934) 
(explaining that a Minnesota statute imposing a mortgage foreclosure moratorium 
addressing an economic hardship that threatened homes and lands was a “legitimate 
end” of protecting “a basic interest of society”). 
 44. See Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 121 (1896) (“No provision of the 
[C]onstitution of the United States has received more frequent consideration by this 
[C]ourt than that which provides that no [S]tate shall pass any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts.”). 
 45. See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 623 (1869) (explaining how the 
Contracts Clause works as “an efficient safeguard against injustice”). 
 46. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54 (1905) (“Therefore, when the 
State, by its legislature, in the assumed exercise of its police powers, has passed an 
act which seriously limits the right to labor or the right of contract . . . it becomes of 
great importance to determine which shall prevail . . . .”); see also Bernstein, Freedom 
of Contract, supra note 41, at 3 (discussing how the Lochner decision perplexed labor 
activists and progressive legal scholars); David P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom to 
Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 51, 58 (2013) 
(discussing how few Supreme Court cases have evoked as much controversy as 
Lochner v. New York). 
 47. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58 (explaining that no condition in a bakery 
could rise to the level necessary to allow the State of New York to use its police power 
to infringe on a private employee’s ability to labor and contract). 
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decision marked the beginning of a thirty-year period where the Court 
struck down protectionist measures states took via their police power 
in favor of economic liberty and private contract rights.48 The Lochner 
era receives criticism for the unrestrained, collective economic 
mindset of the Justices that comprised the Court.49 That is, a majority 
of the Court adhered to laissez-faire economics, which is the theory 
that individuals have the freedom to bargain on their own volition 
without government interference.50 The tendency of the Court to allow 
for unrestrained contractual liberty appeared so engrained in its 
collective mindset that even the Justices opposed to free-market 
economic measures joined majorities on stare decisis grounds.51 
A series of early twentieth-century Court cases signaled a 
slowdown for Contracts Clause litigation.52 By 1978, the Court felt it 
was necessary to explain that the Contracts Clause still remained in 
full force and effect.53 The Court attributed the decline in relevance to 
the Fourteenth Amendment because the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides for protection against state infringement of both existing and 
future contracts.54 In practical terms, however, the Court’s discussion 
 
 48. See Weber, supra note 46, at 58 (“During the Lochner era, lasting 
approximately thirty years, courts struck down laws if they were perceived as 
encroaching on economic liberty or private contract rights.”). 
 49. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and 
the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2003) 
[hereinafter Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism] (“The Lochner era Justices, infected 
with class bias, knew that their substantive due process decisions favored large 
corporations and harmed workers.”); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (2003) (explaining that Lochner is generally agreed to be 
among the most infamous Supreme Court decisions). 
 50. See Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of 
Bargains: Procedural Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 925, 930 (“Commercial growth and activism combined with laissez-faire 
economics, which dominated commerce in the nineteenth century. Individualism and 
objectivity in the formation and scrutiny of bargains became bedrock elements of 
contract law.”). 
 51. See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 49, at 3–4 (“Once 
liberty of contract was established as a constitutional right, even Justices not inclined 
to Social Darwinism or laissez-faire ideology felt obligated to formalistically follow 
precedent, ignoring social conditions and the need for ameliorative legislation.”). 
 52. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447–48 (1934) 
(using the emergency powers doctrine to justify retroactive impairment of a pre-
existing contract); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (justifying state 
police power to impair a contractual obligation). 
 53. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978) 
(“[T]he Contract Clause remains part of the Constitution. It is not a dead letter.”). 
 54. See id. (discussing how modern due process case law has developed to 
all but eliminate the need for Contracts Clause litigation); see also Belfort, supra note 
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ensured the Contracts Clause would not be the primary vehicle under 
which private litigants would enforce their private contractual rights.55 
The Court’s own actions in early to mid-twentieth-century litigation 
contributed significantly to the lack of contemporaneous Contracts 
Clause litigation.56  
First, the Supreme Court recognized the several states’ use of 
police power as a basis for infringing upon a private contractual 
relationship.57 In Manigualt v. Springs, the Court allowed a contracting 
party to rely on subsequent legislation to breach a contractual 
agreement, thus placing the public welfare above any rights the private 
contract created among the parties.58 The Court maintained that a 
state’s police power allowed a change in policy to obstruct a 
preexisting contractual relationship.59 For the first time, the Court put 
an emphasis on maintaining the health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare of the public over private individuals’ right to contract.60  
Second, the Court endorsed the states’ use of the emergency 
powers doctrine.61 Such doctrine allows states to forgo certain legal 
rights and processes in the face of exigent circumstances.62 An 
application of the doctrine occurred during World War I in Block v. 
Hirsh, where the Court upheld rent control laws intended to combat 
the lack of available housing as a permissible intrusion on private 
 
22, at 22 (discussing how the Fourteenth Amendment overtook the Contracts Clause 
in the protection of private, individual contract rights). 
 55. See Ely, supra note 32, at 376 (“To explain that a constitutional provision 
is not dead is a sure sign that it is virtually comatose.”). 
 56. See id. at 387 (explaining that the Supreme Court slowly refrained from 
adamantly enforcing private contractual relationships beginning in the early twentieth 
century). 
 57. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523–25 (1934) (discussing in 
detail the Court’s role in upholding state police power). 
 58. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (“It is the settled law 
of this [C]ourt that . . . statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent 
the state from exercising such powers as are vested in it for . . . the general good of 
the public . . . .”).  
 59. See id. (“[P]arties . . . entering into contracts, may not estop the 
legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good.”).  
 60. See Ely, supra note 32, at 387 (explaining that private contracts were 
subordinate to legislative measures that considered the public welfare).  
 61. See id. at 387–88 (explaining the emergency powers doctrine was not 
explicitly set forth in the Constitution). 
 62. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A 
Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210, 210 (2004) (“In cases of an 
urgent threat to the state or regime, constitutions sometimes permit the delegation of 
powers to a president, or to some other constitutional authority, to issue decrees, to 
censor information, and to suspend legal processes and rights.”). 
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contract and property rights.63 The Court, without addressing the 
competing rights under the Contracts Clause, held that a housing 
shortage was an exigent circumstance of higher import than individual 
contract and property rights.64  
The Court’s ruling in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell 
was its first attempt at balancing the Contracts Clause and the 
emergency powers doctrine.65 The decision relied chiefly on the Block 
decision upholding World War I rent control laws.66 Blaisdell involved 
a Minnesota statute that allowed for a two-year moratorium on 
mortgage foreclosures.67 In upholding the state statute, the Court 
balanced the competing interests of responding to the effects of the 
Great Depression and ensured that the Contracts Clause remained a 
check on state infringement of private contractual relationships.68  
Minnesota lawmakers sought to rely on the emergency powers 
doctrine when drafting the mortgage moratorium at issue in 
Blaisdell.69 Moreover, a private mortgage holder challenged the law as 
 
 63. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921) (“A part of exigency is to 
secure a speedy and summary administration of the law and we are not prepared to 
say that the suspension of ordinary remedies was not a reasonable provision of a 
statute reasonable in its aim and intent.”); see also Michael R. Belknap, The New Deal 
and the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 82–83 (1983) 
(“Congress . . . had enacted these laws to cure housing shortages . . . caused by the 
World War I mobilization and the accompanying curtailment of civilian home 
construction.”). 
 64. See Ely, supra note 32, at 388 (“A sharply divided Supreme Court upheld 
municipal rent control laws as a temporary limit on property and contractual rights 
made necessary by shortages in the rental housing market, resulting in part from a 
cessation of building activity during the war.”). 
 65. See 290 U.S. 398, 415–16 (1934) (discussing how plaintiff was 
challenging a Minnesota mortgage moratorium law as “repugnant” to the Contracts 
Clause).  
 66. See id. at 444 (explaining that the legislature and courts of Minnesota 
acted consistent with precedent in recognizing the existence of an emergency); 
Belknap, supra note 63, at 93 (explaining the chief consequence of the Blaisdell 
decision was the ability of states to invoke the emergency powers doctrine in non-
wartime conditions). 
 67. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416 (“The act provides that, during the 
emergency declared to exist, relief may be had through authorized judicial 
proceedings with respect to foreclosures of mortgages, and execution sales, of real 
estate; that sales may be postponed and periods of redemption may be extended.”). 
 68. See Ely, supra note 32, at 389 (“Most likely, Chief Justice Hughes hoped 
to permit the states room to deal with the unusual circumstances of the Great 
Depression, while at the same time keeping the Contract Clause as a meaningful 
restraint on the states.”). 
 69. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416 (discussing the text of the mortgage 
moratorium law). 
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a retroactive impairment of his constitutionally protected contractual 
rights.70 The Court agreed with lawmakers, maintaining that the 
Contracts Clause was a fluid provision that could give way to 
emergency circumstances intended to protect the economic and 
financial security of the public.71 However, the dissent maintained that 
neither the Contracts Clause nor any other constitutional provision 
could be adapted to support modern notions of financial or economic 
exigency.72 Three years following the Blaisdell decision, in West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court effectively thwarted the 
effectiveness of the Contracts Clause when it posited freedom of 
contract principles yield to the public interest.73 
In the decades of post-Lochner era decisions, not all 
constitutional provisions have remained stifled by state police power.74 
Specifically, the First Amendment received “preferred position” when 
the Court decided Murdock v. Pennsylvania, an economic regulations 
case.75 In Murdock, several Jehovah’s Witnesses appealed their 
conviction under a municipal ordinance requiring licensure to sell 
goods within the city limits.76 In overturning the members’ conviction, 
the Court maintained that the First Amendment is facially absolute and 
 
 70. See id. at 415–16 (“Appellant contests the validity of . . . [the law] . . . as 
being repugnant to the [C]ontract [C]lause . . . .”).  
 71. See id. at 443 (“When we consider the [C]ontract [C]lause and the 
decisions which have expounded it in harmony with the essential reserved power of 
the states to protect the security of their peoples, we find no warrant for the conclusion 
that the clause has been warped . . . .”).  
 72. See id. at 448–49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (explaining a provision in 
the Constitution is not susceptible to competing interpretations depending on the time 
and circumstances).  
 73. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (“There is 
no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of 
liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department of activity 
which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide 
restrictive safeguards.”). 
 74. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (“Freedom of 
press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”); see also 
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1915, 1918–19 (2016) (discussing the “preferred position” the First Amendment 
has occupied since the Court’s decision in Murdock).  
 75. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106, 115 (discussing the Jeannette, Pennsylvania, 
business license ordinance that was invalidated as an impermissible commercial free 
speech regulation).  
 76. See id. at 106 (“[A]ll persons canvassing for or soliciting within said 
Borough, orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares, or merchandise of any kind, or 
persons delivering such articles under orders so obtained or solicited, shall be required 
to procure from the Burgess a license to transact said business . . . .”).  
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denied the respondent’s position that the ordinance’s 
nondiscriminatory nature protected it from strict scrutiny review.77 
The Murdock decision received praise for its defense of the First 
Amendment, but not all of the Justices praised the opinion as correct 
on all fronts.78 Justices Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson 
cautioned their fellow Justices that the Court’s actions in Murdock 
were the very judicial economic decision-making for which the 
Lochner era Court received criticism.79 In its post-Murdock 
jurisprudence, the Court has taken care to reign in its Lochner-esque 
economic lawmaking in Murdock by tempering the reach of the First 
Amendment.80 Specifically, the Court has endorsed the use of time, 
place, and manner restrictions as a permissible freedom of speech 
curtailment, where countervailing concerns of the public welfare are 
involved.81 
Some scholars argue that the time is right to return to the 
Lochner era in one key regard: protecting the fundamental ability of 
parties to contract without substantial state interference.82 The strategy 
 
 77. See id. at 115 (“The fact that the ordinance is ‘nondiscriminatory’ is 
immaterial. The protection afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted.”).  
 78. See Kessler, supra note 74, at 1919 (discussing the Murdock Court’s 
dissenting Justices’ viewpoints).  
 79. See id. at 1967–68 (discussing the reservations held by Justices Roberts, 
Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson concerning the majority’s economic regulation in the 
name of protecting civil liberties).  
 80. See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 957 (2020) (discussing how 
protected speech may be reasonably restricted). The first case to curtail individual 
First Amendment speech rights was Cox v. New Hampshire, a case that precedes 
Murdock chronologically, which upheld the government’s ability to regulate the time, 
place, and manner of speech. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) 
(discussing the ability of a municipality to regulate free speech as matter of public 
welfare). Interestingly, the Cox case also involved Jehovah’s Witnesses as petitioners, 
who were found in violation of a municipal statute “prohibiting a ‘parade or 
procession’ upon a public street without a special license.” Id. at 570–71. 
 81. See Cox, 312 U.S. at 574 (“Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the 
Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order 
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The 
authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and 
convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as 
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good 
order upon which they ultimately depend.”).  
 82. See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 49, at 31 (arguing 
that Lochner should be considered in light of what the Court was attempting to 
accomplish: protection of fundamental rights against government intrusion); Weber, 
supra note 46, at 56–57 (“To be sure, this article is not arguing for a return to 
Lochnerian jurisprudence based on a laissez faire approach to the market in which 
wage and hour laws, child labor laws, and the like were invalidated as impositions on 
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for returning to the fundamental ability to contract likely lies in 
broadening the appropriate constitutional standard of review.83 As 
most first-year law students learn, there are three primary levels of 
judicial scrutiny used by federal courts when evaluating government 
actions or laws: rational basis scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and 
strict scrutiny.84 The impetus behind such review is a judicial 
determination as to whether the government law or action comports 
with the Constitution.85 A reviewing court focuses on: (1) the 
government interest; (2) the relationship between the government 
interest and the government methodology for accomplishing its 
objective; and (3) the burdens imposed by the chosen methodology.86 
Moreover, the Court defines the appropriate standard of review in any 
given case by evaluating a wealth of factors, including whether its 
decision to apply a heighted standard of review to a particular law or 
action will encourage a panoply of claims from similarly situated 
parties.87 
Generally, reviewing courts employ rational basis scrutiny, the 
least exacting standard, when evaluating the constitutionality of a 
government entity’s action with regard to economic regulations, 
which are most often the underlying interest involved in freedom of 
contract disputes.88 However, in limited instances, post-Lochner era 
courts reviewing government interference with private contracts 
 
the ‘freedom of contract.’ Rather, the freedom to contract argued for is the basic right 
of an individual to enter into agreements that gain or dispose of possessions, services 
or otherwise alter legal relationships.”). 
 83. See Weber, supra note 46, at 89 (explaining plaintiffs asserting 
infringement of contract rights aim to avoid the strict-scrutiny standard of review). 
 84. See R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection 
Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base 
Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 227–
28 (2002) (arguing that practically the Supreme Court uses six standards of review).  
 85. See id. at 227 (discussing the three constituent parts of any 
constitutionality review).  
 86. See id. at 227–28 (explaining the relationship between constituent parts 
and the primary standards of review).  
 87. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 
(discussing the difficulty in justifying disparate treatment among the elderly, disabled, 
and the mentally ill).  
 88. See Bryan J. Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics: Freedom of Contract, 
Federalism, and the Fight Over Health Care, 27 J.L. & POL. 177, 197 (2011) 
(explaining economic regulations are most often upheld as valid under rational basis 
standard of review); Weber, supra note 46, at 62 (“The general framework then for 
evaluating economic regulations, being an issue of freedom of liberty, is to apply a 
rational basis standard.”). 
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applied the intermediate scrutiny standard of review.89 The Court 
applied the intermediate standard of review because most decisions 
during this era centered upon contracts that disproportionately 
affected minorities and women in employment and wage negotiations 
with employers.90 Interestingly, even twenty years after the New Deal, 
the Court still was willing to lower the states’ evidentiary hurdle under 
the rational basis test.91 In the Court’s most recent Contracts Clause 
case, Sveen v. Melin, the Court did not have the opportunity to adopt 
a standard of review.92 In reality, the revocation-on-divorce statute did 
not fully implicate the Contracts Clause because the Court ruled the 
ex-wife lacked a contractual relationship with her decedent ex-
husband’s insurance company.93 Thus, scholars will likely continue to 
postulate whether the Roberts Court will adopt post-Lochner era Court 
decisions using a rational basis standard of review when evaluating 
freedom of contract claims.94  
In the 1965, the Court identified certain fundamental rights that 
are present in the penumbras of the Constitution, such as the right to 
 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153–54 
(1938) (discussing how the underlying effects of the contract are what determines the 
applicable standard of review).  
 90. See Weber, supra note 46, at 62 (“For cases involving economic 
regulations that disproportionately affect vulnerable parties or are arbitrary or 
discriminatory restraints on their liberty, including their freedom of contract, the Court 
recognized the need for enhanced scrutiny.”). 
 91. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 
(1955) (“But the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to 
be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it 
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct 
it.”); see also G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 203–04 (2d 
prtg. 2001) (explaining that the Court Justices of the 1930s and 1940s were free to 
shape their doctrine). 
 92. See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1821–22 (2018) (discussing the two-
step review for Contracts Clause claims).  
 93. See id. at 1822 (explaining that the Court’s Contracts Clause analysis 
could stop after the first step because the revocation-on-divorce statute did not 
substantially impair a pre-existing contract).  
 94. See David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment 
to the Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 299, 331 
(Michael C. Dorf ed., 2009) [hereinafter Bernstein, The Story of Lochner] (arguing 
the logic of the Lochner decision should apply to protect economic rights); Steven C. 
Begakis, Rediscovering Liberty of Contract: The Unnoticed Economic Right 
Contained in the Freedom of Speech, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 57, 59–60 (2017) 
(discussing the unusual lack of protection afforded to freedom of contract rights). 
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privacy, in Griswold v. Connecticut.95 The Court finds these 
penumbras implicit in the Bill of Rights.96 The fundamental rights that 
fall within these so-called penumbras, as with explicit fundamental 
rights, are deeply rooted rights and liberties in America’s history and 
are traditions deemed fundamental.97 In his concurrence in Griswold, 
Justice Byron White advocated for a strict scrutiny standard of review 
that would protect both enumerated and unenumerated fundamental 
liberties when subject to state regulation.98  
Most legal minds agree that the Lochner era Court’s disposition 
with regard to the freedom of contract was perversely in favor of 
individual autonomy in a free-market economy.99 However, the 
disfavored status of Lochner also has meant that courts have 
completely abandoned the exacting scrutiny it once applied to freedom 
of contract principles.100 Consequently, scholars argue that reviewing 
courts should consider freedom of contract a fundamental right that 
deserves stronger protection against arbitrary and capricious actions 
by state governments.101 Recognizing a more deferential standard of 
 
 95. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–84 (1965) (holding that 
the right to privacy is present in the margins of those guarantees provided by the 
federal Bill of Rights). 
 96. See id. at 484 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516–22 (1961) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting)) (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance.”).  
 97. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (“[T]he Court 
has regularly observed that the [Due Process] Clause specially protects those 
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.”); see also Weber, supra note 46, at 62 (discussing the locutions 
employed by the Court when defining fundamental rights). 
 98. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 503–04 (White, J., concurring) (maintaining 
that marriage as a fundamental liberty, not a notion of privacy, controls whether strict 
scrutiny is applied).  
 99. See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 49, at 4–5 
(explaining that conventional legal theory suggests Lochner is permanently 
disfavored law); Weber, supra note 46, at 58 (“In the United States, few Supreme 
Court decisions have engendered as much controversy as the 1905 decision Lochner 
v. New York.”).  
 100. See Weber, supra note 46, at 62–63 (“While it is true that the Lochner 
era demonstrated a need for legislative intervention in some aspects of contracting, it 
would be inappropriate to analogize discrete restrictions for a specific type of contract 
with the broader prescription that would prevent an individual from contractually 
obligating himself in nearly any type of contract.”). 
 101. See Begakis, supra note 94, at 60 (“But the U.S. Constitution, the 
supreme charter of English freedom, currently provides zero protection against 
arbitrary abridgements of this freedom.”); Weber, supra note 46, at 62 (explaining 
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review is likely to result in increased Contracts Clause litigation, and 
a cause of action under § 1983 would allow such litigation to make its 
way into federal courts.102 
B. Historical Background and Development of § 1983  
Congress enacted §1983 as a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
which was also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.103 The statute was, in 
effect, a method of creating federal jurisdiction for the violation of 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.104 The Court has ruled that a claim 
under § 1983 has two elements: (1) the plaintiff must assert a violation 
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and 
(2) the plaintiff must demonstrate that the asserted violation was 
committed by a person acting under the authority of state law or 
custom.105 The first litigation to test the effects of § 1983 were the post-
 
that in instances of arbitrary or capricious laws a strict-scrutiny standard of review 
applies). 
 102. See Beermann, supra note 24, at 9 (explaining that federalism concerns 
caution courts in extending § 1983 into areas more adequately addressed by state law).  
 103. See Clarke, supra note 32, at 155 (“Congress intended 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, a part of which has come down to us as 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, to . . . provide[] federal court jurisdiction for any citizen whose rights 
were abridged by any person acting under the color of state law.”); Brad Reid, A Legal 
Overview of Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2017, 
11:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-legal-overview-of-section-
1983-civil-rights-litigation_us_58f0e17ee4b048372700d793 [https://perma.cc/ 
6VM6-NFVS] (explaining how Congress promulgated the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
as part of legal developments emanating out of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments). The Civil Rights Act of 1871, known in the alternative as the 
Third Force Act, is a part of a series of three acts passed by Congress from May 1870 
to April 1871. See Landmark Legislation: The Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871, 
U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/ 
EnforcementActs.htm [https://perma.cc/V952-D2FV] (last visited Mar. 16, 2020). 
The tripartite legislation gives force to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments, by deterring the actions of white supremacist groups, primarily the Ku 
Klux Klan, aimed at disfranchising black Americans. See id.  
 104. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543, 551 (1972) 
(discussing how § 1983 does not distinguish between personal and property rights, 
although the distinguishing hallmarks of each are often difficult to make out); see also 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 3.03 (discussing the Court’s debunking of the division 
of personal and property rights). 
 105. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (“To state a claim under § 
1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed 
by a person acting under color of state law.”); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 
922, 937 (1982) (discussing the Court’s two-step approach). 
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Reconstruction civil rights cases in South Carolina in 1871 and 
1872.106 However, such litigation provided scant interpretation of the 
scope of § 1983 because the Court declined to recognize that the 
statute provided a cause of action for all federally protected rights.107 
The scope of § 1983 remained in question throughout the Jim Crow 
era until the beginning of the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 
1960s.108 
The full force and effect of § 1983 was not realized until around 
ninety years after its enactment when the Court decided Monroe v. 
Pape in 1961.109 In Monroe, Chicago police officers conducted a 
search on a residence without a valid search warrant.110 The Court 
undertook the task of interpreting the phrase “under color of” law or 
custom as used in § 1983.111 The Court concluded, after discussing the 
judicial and legislative history of § 1983, that “under color of” 
included actions taken pursuant to state law or state authority.112 The 
Court ruled further in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New 
York that its interpretation of the legislative history of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871 made clear that municipalities should also be included in 
the definition of a state actor.113 However, much confusion surrounds 
the scope of municipal liability because appellate courts have declined 
to reconcile § 1983 with state deprivation of constitutional rights 
 
 106. See Clarke, supra note 32, at 156 (“The first major test of Reconstruction 
civil rights legislation came in the South Carolina Ku Klux Klan trials of 1871 to 
1872.”). 
 107. See id. at 156–57 (maintaining that the Court declined to expand the 
scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in an effort to signal the end of Reconstruction).  
 108. See Beermann, supra note 24, at 11–12 (explaining the substance of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was also the basis of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).  
 109. See Clarke, supra note 32, at 158 (discussing the changed scope of federal 
liability, enforceability in federal court, and accountability of government officials); 
see also Reid, supra note 103 (“This decision allowed individual governmental 
employees to be sued for acts that violate the Constitution or statutes.”). 
 110. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168–69 (1961) (explaining how 
petitioners alleged the officers failed to procure a valid search or arrest warrant and 
did so while holding themselves out as acting on behalf of the government).  
 111. See id. at 182–87 (discussing how the Court’s previous interpretations of 
“under color of” law were not challenged by subsequent legislative amendments).  
 112. See id. at 187 (“We conclude that the meaning given ‘under color of’ law 
in the [Classic] case in the [Screws] and [Williams] cases was the correct one; and we 
adhere to it.”). 
 113. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (“Our 
analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the 
conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units 
to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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statutes.114 Such confusion creates a perverse incentive for entities in 
contract with municipalities to perform below a reasonable standard 
of care because § 1983 does not impose liability on common 
tortfeasors.115 
Several procedural advantages exist for plaintiffs bringing suit 
under § 1983 as opposed to another federal statute.116 Primarily, 
plaintiffs bring suit under § 1983 to bring a claim in federal court, 
rather than state court.117 Additional procedural advantages include the 
potential for a longer statute of limitations and a larger award of 
damages, including the possibility for the award of punitive 
damages.118 A prevailing party is also entitled to the payment of 
attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.119  
Procedural advantages are also available to a defendant asserting 
a § 1983 claim—primarily, qualified immunity.120 The qualified 
immunity defense applies to defendants when their conduct does not 
encroach upon those rights vested in the Constitution.121 The qualified 
 
 114. See, e.g., Robinson v. Solano Cty., 218 F.3d 1030, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding local government units in California liable under a theory of 
respondeat superior); Washington v. Robertson Cty., 29 S.W.3d 466, 475 (Tenn. 
2000) (declining to following the Court’s interpretation of § 1983). Three years prior 
to the proceeding decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed its reasoning in Monell. See 
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (affirming its reasoning in 
Monell).  
 115. See Crump v. Corr. Med. Servs., 647 F. Supp. 2d 375, 379 (D. Del. 2009) 
(declining to impose § 1983 liability on contractors in contract with a municipality).  
 116. See Beermann, supra note 24, at 14 (explaining that courts need to 
analyze why plaintiffs bring suit under § 1983 against the backdrop of the procedural 
and substantive advantages).  
 117. See id. (explaining that the ability to bring suit in federal court eliminates 
state procedural requirements, such as the notice of claim procedure and mandatory 
pre-screenings in medical malpractice actions).  
 118. See id. (discussing the award of damages may be larger due to the 
potential for punitive damages). 
 119. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2018) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce 
a provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of 
the costs . . . .”); see also Glen N. Lenhoff, A View of the Present and Future of 42 
USC 1983, 94 MICH. B.J. 28, 30–31 (2015) (explaining that the award of attorney’s 
fees are typically larger in personal injury cases than in civil rights cases that most 
often involve police officers, with whom the jury often sympathizes). 
 120. See Lenhoff, supra note 119, at 29 (citing Owen v. City of Indep., 445 
U.S. 622, 638 (1980)) (“An individual defendant in a 42 USC [§] 1983 case has the 
right to assert the defense of qualified immunity. This defense is not available for 
municipal defendants, however.”). 
 121. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014) (citing Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)) (“An official sued under § 1983 is entitled to 
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immunity defense does not exculpate a § 1983 defendant from 
liability; federal courts will afford special attention to ensuring that the 
facts are applied in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff.122  
Nevertheless, the substantive advantages are more likely to be 
the impetus behind a claimant’s choice to pursue a § 1983 claim.123 
Often, no state claim is available to provide redress for an aggrieved 
party for much of the conduct that is deemed illegal under § 1983.124 
Alternatively, plaintiffs tend to bring suit under § 1983 for even those 
suits that can be brought both in federal and state courts because many 
state causes of action place caps on compensatory and punitive 
damages.125  
The Contracts Clause was once a bastion for defending 
individual liberties; however, its commonality in litigation has been 
largely nonexistent since the early twentieth century.126 Conversely, 
claims asserting deprivations of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 largely 
increased in the years after the Court defined the scope of the statute 
 
qualified immunity unless it is shown that the official violated a statutory or 
constitutional right that was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged 
conduct. . . . And a defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established 
right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official 
in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.”). 
 122. See Lenhoff, supra note 119, at 29 (explaining the critical nature for 
federal courts to view the facts in a manner that is deferential to the plaintiff). 
 123. See Beermann, supra note 24, at 14, 18 (explaining that while procedural 
factors are an important reason for plaintiffs to bring claims under § 1983, the 
substantive factors are just as important).  
 124. See id. at 14 (“The most fundamental substantive reason for seeking 
remedies under section 1983 is that there may be no liability under state law for much 
of the conduct that gives rise to § 1983 claims.”). 
 125. See id. at 19 (discussing how many states eliminated immunity for 
government and charitable entities in favor of placing caps or complete bars on the 
amount of compensatory and punitive damages that could be awarded against 
municipalities). 
 126. See Bernstein, Freedom of Contract, supra note 41, at 6–8 (explaining 
that New Deal era measures have largely confined the scope of Contracts Claims 
asserted against the states); see also George Leef, The Supreme Court Will Soon 
Decide: Uphold the Contract Clause or Let It Die?, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2018, 12:00 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2018/03/13/the-supreme-court-will-
soon-decide-uphold-the-contract-clause-or-let-it-die/#4cf8453435a1 [https:// 
perma.cc/HT7N-GS32] (“In the first century or so of our national existence, one of 
the Constitution’s provisions that was most often at issue was the Contract Clause. 
But following New Deal era decisions that eviscerated it, hardly any cases have since 
centered on it.”).  
274 Michigan State Law Review  2020 
in Monroe v. Pape.127 Section 1983’s attractive procedural and 
substantive features expanded the amount of Contracts Clause claims 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.128 Moreover, a 
difference of opinion as to the proper interpretation of the Supreme 
Court case discussing § 1983’s predecessor statute and its relationship 
to the Contracts Clause has provided the perfect environment for an 
active circuit split among the federal appellate courts.129  
II. A LOOK INTO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Federal appellate courts disagree on whether § 1983 is the most 
appropriate method to bring a civil action against a state government 
for retroactively infringing a contract.130 The Court has only ruled on 
the issue pursuant to § 1983 once before, in the late nineteenth-century 
case Carter v. Greenhow.131 The Carter decision has stood for the 
proposition that any individual rights afforded under the Contracts 
Clause are secondary in the sense that the rights secured are not 
cognizable under § 1983.132 Carter was the word of the Court until it 
granted certiorari to determine whether a Dormant Commerce Clause 
claim warranted a cause of action under § 1983 in Dennis v. Higgins.133 
 
 127. See Symposium, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in Wake of Monroe v. 
Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1486–87 (1969) (discussing how Monroe v. Pape 
expanded the scope of claims brought under § 1983). 
 128. See, e.g., Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 341 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(discussing that plaintiff city employees alleged state impairment of retirement 
benefits); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 637–38 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(describing retired police officers’ suit for contractual impairment); S. Cal. Gas Co. 
v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing company’s suit 
against city government for passing an ordinance that retroactively impaired their pre-
existing contract). 
 129. See Nahmod, supra note 12 (explaining the federal circuits’ rulings on 
whether actions under § 1983 are allowed for Contracts Clause violations).  
 130. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 3.03 (explaining that lower courts 
are in disagreement as to whether the Contracts Clause is actionable under § 1983); 
Nahmod, supra note 12 (providing a brief overview of the federal circuit split). 
 131. See Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1885) (discussing how the 
petitioner’s contractual right to pay his State of Virginia taxes in bonds was protected 
by the Contracts Clause).  
 132. See id. (“That constitutional provision [the Contracts Clause], so far as it 
can be said to confer upon or secure to any person any individual rights, does so only 
indirectly and incidentally.”).  
 133. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 440 (1991) (7-2 decision) 
(resolving a circuit split as to whether a Dormant Commerce Clause violation can be 
enforced as a cause of action under § 1983); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 27,             
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The Dennis decision was also important in discrediting the proposition 
that only Fourteenth Amendment rights could be asserted under § 
1983.134 By expanding the scope of § 1983 and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, the Court invited lower federal courts, by way of 
a footnote, to offer their differing opinions as to whether the Contracts 
Clause was a constitutional right deserving of enforceability under § 
1983.135  
A. The Carter Case 
The Court first ruled on the relationship between § 1983 and the 
Contracts Clause in Carter v. Greenhow.136 The plaintiff in Carter 
brought suit to challenge the City of Richmond’s decision to disallow 
payment of taxes using state issued bond coupons.137 The plaintiff’s 
main contention was that an amended Virginia statute barred his 
contractual right to pay tax using bond coupons, thus forbidding tax 
collectors from accepting such coupons as payment.138 The plaintiff 
interpreted such an action as the government providing the defendant 
tax collector with the authority to act “under color of” law to deprive 
the plaintiff of his constitutionally protected interest.139  
 
§ 3.03 (explaining how split authority existed concerning a Dormant Commerce 
Clause cause of action under § 1983 given the original legislative intent of § 1983).  
 134. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 3.03 (discussing how Dennis v. Higgins 
was the first Court decision to maintain a § 1983 cause of action for a non-Fourteenth 
Amendment right).  
 135. See Dennis, 498 U.S. at 451 n.9 (explaining how the dissent used the 
Carter decision to argue the Dormant Commerce Clause was similar to the Contracts 
Clause in that they do not “secure any rights, privileges, or immunities within the 
meaning of § 1983”). 
 136. See Carter, 114 U.S. at 321–22 (discussing § 1983’s predecessor statute); 
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 402 (1982) (explaining that § 1983’s predecessor, R.S. § 1979, 
is substantially similar to § 1983 and the result of a congressional reorganizing of 
statutes and regulations into a centralized location).  
 137. See Carter, 114 U.S. at 318–19 (discussing how the plaintiff’s cause of 
action was based on his inability to pay his taxes in the manner he saw fit). 
 138. See id. at 319–20 (discussing how an amendment to Virginia tax law by 
the Virginia General Assembly caused defendant tax collector to act “under color of 
[law]”).  
 139. Id. at 320 (“That in refusing to receive the said coupons and money in 
payment of said taxes, and in levying on and seizing the plaintiff’s property for said 
taxes, after the plaintiff had tendered the same in payment thereof, the defendant 
deprived the plaintiff of a right secured to him by the constitution of the United States, 
under color of statutes . . . .”). 
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The Court implicated the Contracts Clause, explaining the 
proviso was the only constitutional provision that provided for and 
secured the rights for which the plaintiff claimed infringement.140 The 
Court further explained that the plaintiff’s right to pay property taxes 
with bond coupons was a right provided by Virginia law and not 
constitutionally by the Contracts Clause.141 Moreover, the Court found 
that the only right guaranteed by the Contracts Clause in this case was 
the right to a judicial hearing and the prospect for invalidation of the 
state action at a hearing.142 The current circuit split arose because the 
Court has never granted certiorari to a case where the plaintiff asserted 
that a Contracts Clause claim was actionable under § 1983.143  
Additionally, the Carter decision suggests that the only remedy 
afforded by § 1983 is the invalidation of a state law that conflicts with 
an individual’s ability to freely contract.144 The plaintiff in Carter only 
sought a determination that the Virginia statute barring him from 
paying his taxes using state issued bonds was in contravention of his 
constitutional right to pay his taxes in any method that satisfied the 
debt obligation.145 In its analysis, the Court saw fit to categorize 
exactly what plaintiff’s claim was by striking a contract between the 
 
 140. Id. at 322 (“How and in what sense are these rights secured to him by the 
constitution of the United States? The answer is, by that provision, article 1, § 10, 
which forbids any state to pass laws impairing the obligations of contracts.”). 
 141. Id. (“The right to pay his taxes in coupons, and the immunity from further 
proceedings, in case of a rejected tender, are not rights directly secured to him by the 
constitution, and only so indirectly as they happen in this case to be the rights of 
contract which he holds under the laws of Virginia.”).  
 142. Id. (“In any judicial proceeding necessary to vindicate his rights under a 
contract affected by such legislation, the individual has a right to have a judicial 
determination declaring the nullity of the attempt to impair its obligation.”). 
 143. See Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 346 (6th Cir. 2017) (explaining 
that even though § 1983 was expanded “post-Monroe,” the Court has yet to confirm 
that a Contracts Clause violation is a recognized claim under § 1983). 
 144. See Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 320–21 (1885) (discussing the 
Court’s interpretation of the sole remedy provided under the Contracts Clause); see 
also Gregory A. Kalscheur, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983: Protecting the Right to Be Free of Protectionist State Action, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
157, 178 (1987) (discussing the Court’s failure to distinguish how the remedy 
available for any other Contracts Clause differed from any other constitutional 
provision). 
 145. See Carter, 114 U.S. at 319 (“That plaintiff was always ready and willing 
to deliver to the defendant in payment of said taxes, up to the moment when the 
defendant so levied upon his said property, the said coupons and money, and he many 
times offered to do so, but the defendant always refused to receive the same. That the 
plaintiff has the right under the constitution of the United States to pay his said taxes 
to the said defendant in the said coupons and money, and that this right is secured to 
him by the constitution of the United States.”). 
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two parties.146 As a result, the Carter decision has long stood for the 
proposition that Contracts Clause violations are not actionable under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.147 The flawed nature of the Carter decision has cast 
some doubt on its significance in barring a Contracts Clause claim 
action under § 1983.148  
B. The Dennis v. Higgins Decision 
The Court has criticized the Carter decision for its precedential 
value as the basis on which courts and parties rely to find that a 
Contracts Clause violation is not actionable under § 1983.149 In Dennis 
v. Higgins, the Court granted certiorari to establish whether Nebraskan 
state officials could be held liable for a violation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause under § 1983.150 The Court held in the affirmative 
and adopted the plaintiff’s argument that the Dormant Commerce 
Clause provided the rights referred to in the meaning of § 1983.151 In 
ruling for the plaintiff, the Court held that § 1983 deserved broad 
construction.152  
 
 146. Id. at 322 (“The rights alleged to be violated are the right to pay taxes in 
coupons instead of in money, and, after a tender of coupons, the immunity from 
further proceeding to collect such taxes as though they were delinquent. These rights 
the plaintiff derives from the contract with the state, contained in the act of March 28, 
1879, and the bonds and coupons issued under its authority.”). 
 147. See Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 346 (quoting Carter, 114 U.S. at 322) (“The 
remedy is not a private cause of action against the state official responsible for the 
contractual impairment, but rather ‘a right to have a judicial determination declaring 
the nullity of the attempt to impair its obligation’ in a suit ‘to vindicate his rights under 
a contract.’”).  
 148. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 451–52 n.9 (1991) (“This 
Court . . . has already given [Carter] a narrow reading, stating that the case held as a 
matter of pleading that the particular cause of action set up in the plaintiff’s pleading 
was in contract and was not to redress deprivation of the right secured to him by that 
clause of the Constitution [the contract clause], to which he had chosen not to resort.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 149. See id. (explaining that the Carter Court held that a contract was created 
as a matter of pleading and was not intended to operate as an action to “redress 
deprivation” under § 1983).  
 150. See id. at 441 (explaining petitioner sought a declaration the motor taxes 
constituted an “unlawful burden” on interstate commerce in violation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause).  
 151. See id. at 446 (“Petitioner contends that the [Dormant] Commerce Clause 
confers ‘rights, privileges, or immunities’ within the meaning of § 1983. We agree.”).  
 152. See id. at 443 (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 
493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989)) (“A broad construction of § 1983 is compelled by the 
statutory language, which speaks of deprivations of ‘any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’”). 
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The Dennis case demonstrated that the limitations of Carter 
were not foreseen when the case was decided in the late nineteenth 
century.153 Specifically, the Dennis Court explained that Supreme 
Court precedent evolved to provide a cause of action for a deprivation 
of any federally protected right, not just those recognized under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.154 Nevertheless, some federal appellate 
courts contend that the Court has yet to explicitly overturn the 
proposition set forth in the Carter case.155 In other words, several of 
the federal appellate courts declining to provide a cause of action for 
Contracts Clause claims under § 1983 await a Court decision similar 
to Dennis v. Higgins.156 Another federal appellate court maintains the 
implications of the Court’s ruling in Dennis v. Higgins were not as far-
reaching as proponents of cognizable Contracts Clause claims 
pursuant to § 1983 would make legal scholars and the public at large 
believe.157  
C. Contracts Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Circuit Split 
Only one federal appellate court has affirmatively concluded that 
§ 1983 provides a cause of action for a violation of the Contracts 
 
 153. See id. at 444–45 (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 
441 U.S. 600, 611 (1979)) (“[T]he ‘prime focus’ of § 1983 and related provisions was 
to ensure ‘a right of action to enforce the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the federal laws enacted pursuant thereto[.]’ . . . [T]he Court has never restricted 
the section’s scope to the effectuation of that goal.”). 
 154. See id. at 445 (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 6–8 (1980)) 
(explaining the phrase “and laws” under § 1983 is not limited to civil rights or equal 
protection legislation).  
 155. See Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 640–41 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(arguing that the Court in Dennis only ruled on whether a violation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause provided a cause of action under § 1983 and that Justice White’s 
footnote discussing Carter was only to illustrate that non-Fourteenth Amendment 
rights may provide for a cause of action under § 1983). 
 156. See, e.g., Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Sch., 876 F.3d 
926, 932 (7th Cir. 2017) (declining to weigh in on a Contracts Clause claim providing 
a cause of action under § 1983); Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 347 (6th Cir. 
2017) (arguing that the plaintiff’s cause of action could not stand because the Carter 
decision had never been explicitly overturned).  
 157. See Crosby, 635 F.3d at 641 (“Justice Matthews’s decision is of limited 
utility in determining whether § 1983 might afford a remedy for infringements of 
federal rights not previously considered in that context. There is little doubt, however, 
that Carter stands even today for the proposition that an attempted § 1983 action 
alleging state impairment of a private contract will not lie.”). 
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Clause.158 In 2003, the Ninth Circuit was the first federal appellate 
court to maintain clearly and unequivocally that a private cause of 
action exists when an individual brings a Contracts Clause claim under 
§ 1983 in Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana.159 A 1938 
city ordinance formed the underlying contract between the City of 
Santa Ana (Santa Ana) and Southern California Gas Company 
(Southern Gas).160 The ordinance provided Southern Gas with the right 
to construct and maintain the piping underneath the streets of Santa 
Ana.161  
The contractual relationship deteriorated when Southern Gas 
brought suit against Santa Ana citing a 2001 ordinance.162 The 
ordinance required any party wishing to make trench cuts within Santa 
Ana to first provide advance payment.163 Southern Gas’s issue with the 
ordinance was, inter alia, that its contract with Santa Ana had been 
“substantially impair[ed]” in violation of the Contracts Clause.164 The 
Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Southern Gas by maintaining that the 
right to contract without impairment was guaranteed by the 
Constitution and could give rise to a claim under § 1983.165 
Specifically, the court maintained that § 1983 clearly stood for the 
proposition that a party was constitutionally protected against the 
actions of a state, or one of its political subdivisions, which “under 
color of” law deprive a party of its rights, privileges, or immunities.166  
In this case, the court agreed with Southern Gas that double 
payment was a “substantial impairment,” given it had already entered 
 
 158. See S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“The City’s argument that section 1983 provides no relief for a party deprived 
of its rights under the Contracts Clause is without merit.”). 
 159. See id. (explaining how the Dennis Court narrowly construed the Carter 
decision). 
 160. See id. (discussing the 1938 ordinance that formed the contract at issue). 
 161. See id. at 887–88 (describing Santa Ana’s desired scope of work for 
Southern Gas).  
 162. See id. at 888 (discussing the 2001 trench cut ordinance).  
 163. See id. (“With certain exceptions, the trench cut ordinance requires 
advance payment by anyone wishing to perform excavations or trench cuts.”). 
 164. See id. (“The Gas Company contends the trench cut ordinance: (1) 
substantially impairs its rights under the 1938 Franchise in violation of the Contract 
Clause, (2) constitutes an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and (3) is arbitrary and capricious in contravention of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process clause.”). 
 165. See id. at 887 (citing Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991)) (“The 
rights guaranteed by section 1983 are ‘liberally and beneficently construed.’”). 
 166. See id. (explaining that the Contracts Clause plainly secures the right 
against retroactive contractual impairment). 
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into a contract with Santa Ana to perform pipe work under its streets.167 
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the application of Court precedent 
from Carter v. Greenhow.168 The court maintained that the Carter 
Court addressed the Contracts Clause only as a matter of poor pleading 
on the part of the plaintiff.169 Also notable was the Ninth Circuit’s 
dismissal of the 2001 ordinance as a permissible use of state police 
power.170 
Alternatively, two federal appellate courts have maintained that 
§ 1983 is an inappropriate vehicle for asserting a Contracts Clause 
violation pursuant to the Constitution.171 In 2011, the Fourth Circuit 
weighed in on the issue in Crosby v. City of Gastonia.172 It asserted 
that the Court in Carter clearly maintained that the only right afforded 
by the Contracts Clause is a determination as to whether the state 
improperly denied the aggrieved access to a judicial proceeding.173 
Such a judicial proceeding serves only to make a determination as to 
whether a contractual right had been impaired.174 The Fourth Circuit 
declined to follow the Ninth Circuit and narrowly construed the 
precedential value of the Justice Byron White’s footnote in Dennis v. 
Higgins.175 The substance of the Fourth Circuit’s argument was that 
 
 167. See id. at 890 (clarifying that substantial impairment does not require 
complete destruction of the contract). 
 168. See id. at 887 (arguing that the decision to recognize a cause of action 
under § 1983 was not contrary to the Court’s holding in Carter). 
 169. See id. (quoting Dennis, 498 U.S. at 451 n.9) (“Carter can only be read 
to have ‘held as a matter of pleading that the particular cause of action set up in the 
plaintiff’s pleading was in contract and was not to redress deprivation of the right 
secured to him by [the Contracts Clause] . . . .’”) (emphasis omitted).  
 170. See id. at 893 (citing U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977)) 
(explaining the police power could not be used to alter a contract’s material terms). 
 171. See generally Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(adopting the Fourth Circuit’s line of reasoning); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 
634 (4th Cir. 2011) (declining to extend the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Southern Gas). 
 172. See Crosby, 635 F.3d at 639–40 (discussing the facts and holding of the 
Carter decision). 
 173. See id. (discussing the Carter court’s explanation of the sole Contracts 
Clause claim remedy).  
 174. See id. at 640 (“As a result of the Supreme Court’s holding in Carter, 
then, recourse to § 1983 for the deprivation of rights secured by the Contracts Clause 
is limited to the discrete instances where a state has denied a citizen the opportunity 
to seek adjudication through the courts as to whether a constitutional impairment of a 
contract has occurred, or has foreclosed the imposition of an adequate remedy for an 
established impairment. Section 1983 provides no basis to complain of an alleged 
impairment in the first instance.”). 
 175. See id. at 640–41 (explaining Justice White’s footnote in Dennis v. 
Higgins). 
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Carter was clear and binding precedent that the Court never directly 
overturned.176  
The Sixth Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit in 2017, when it also 
declined to provide a cause of action for a Contracts Clause claim 
pursuant to § 1983.177 The Sixth Circuit recognized that the Court in 
Carter took to deciding whether the Contracts Clause was a 
cognizable cause of action under § 1983’s predecessor statute.178 
However, it quickly dismissed any argument suggesting that the two 
versions would cause the outcome to change.179 The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that the conjecture extended by the federal appellate courts 
was unnecessary.180 Instead, the Sixth Circuit opined that it was up to 
the Supreme Court to make a judicial determination as to whether 
Carter was still good law.181 
Elsewhere, two federal appellate courts mentioned the 
interpretive issues regarding the Carter decision, but they either 
declined to weigh in or were not given the opportunity.182 The First 
Circuit in Parella v. Retirement Board of Rhode Island Retirement 
System found that a New Jersey State retirement board’s withholding 
of benefits did not violate the Contracts Clause.183 The court in Parella 
was not provided the opportunity to analyze the plaintiff’s Contracts 
Clause claim under § 1983 because the parties lacked a contractual 
relationship.184 Specifically, the court declined to recognize a contract 
 
 176. See id. at 640 (discussing that the Contracts Clause was never directly 
implicated by the Court in Dennis). 
 177. See Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 347 (6th Cir. 2017) (“We join the 
Fourth Circuit and hold that an alleged Contracts Clause violation cannot give rise to 
a cause of action under § 1983.”). 
 178. See id. at 346 (discussing the statute at issue in Carter v. Greenhow). 
 179. See id. (explaining that the two statutes contain “‘substantially identical’ 
language”).  
 180. See id. at 347 (positing that the role of appellate courts is not to overturn 
Supreme Court precedent). 
 181. See id. (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)) (“[The 
Fourth Circuit’s view] comports with the time-honored principle that ‘it is [the 
Supreme Court’s] prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.’”). 
 182. See Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Sch., 876 F.3d 926, 
932 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that it was not weighing in on the issue); see also 
Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps. Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 62 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining 
that plaintiff failed to establish a contractual relationship, making a § 1983 analysis 
for the Contracts Clause claim futile).  
 183. See Parella, 173 F.3d at 62 (“We hold that the plaintiffs’ claim fails to 
pass the first component of the first part of the Contract Clause test—proving the 
existence of a contractual relationship.”). 
 184. See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 
411–12 (1983) (discussing the first step in evaluating a Contracts Clause claim); 
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between the parties because there was no indication from the 
applicable statute that the government intended to bind itself 
contractually.185  
The Seventh Circuit in Elliott v. Board of School Trustees of 
Madison Consolidated Schools recognized the active circuit split 
concerning § 1983 and the Contracts Clause; however, it chose to 
conduct its analysis without weighing in.186 The court asserted that 
weighing in on the issue was not necessary for multiple reasons.187 
Namely, the issue did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
over the issue and the defendant failed to raise the Carter case as a 
defense at the district court level.188  
The Court’s holding in Carter v. Greenhow concerning the 
constitutional role of the Contracts Clause remains intact, despite the 
Court’s anecdotal mention of the issue in Dennis v. Higgins.189 
Moreover, subsequent § 1983 and Contracts Clause jurisprudence has 
created room for debate regarding what the Carter decision offers in 
terms of precedent.190 The inaction of the Seventh Circuit in Elliott 
suggests federal appellate courts are finished providing speculation 
 
Parella, 173 F.3d. at 57 n.9 (“Thus, we do not reach the question whether a claim for 
attorneys’ fees or for a discretionary award of prejudgment interest under § 1983 are 
themselves enough to avoid mootness after the main claim has become moot.”).  
 185. See Parella, 173 F.3d at 60 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465–66 (1985)) (“Indeed, 
‘absent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, 
the presumption is that a law is not intended to create private contractual or vested 
rights.’”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 186. See Elliott, 876 F.3d at 931–32 (explaining that it recognized the 
interpretive chasm among the other federal appellate courts but was declining to offer 
its opinion).  
 187. See id. at 932 (discussing the reasons why the court was not offering an 
opinion on the § 1983 and Contracts Clause circuit split). 
 188. See id. (“We need not take sides on this question. It does not affect our 
subject matter jurisdiction, and the defendants have waived this potential defense. 
They did not raise it in the district court, and the State told us at argument that the 
defendants do not rely on Carter.”).  
 189. See Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional 
Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1518 (1983) (discussing 
how the Court arrived at its “odd conclusion” in Carter). 
 190. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 451 n.9 (1991) (discussing how the 
Contracts Clause, a non-Fourteenth Amendment right, is actionable under § 1983); 
Sunstein, supra note 136, at 409–11 (discussing § 1983 developments in the twentieth 
century). 
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concerning the relationship between § 1983 and the Contracts 
Clause.191 
III. WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT 
SPLIT 
The Court’s recent jurisprudence regarding the Contracts Clause 
makes settling the decades-long circuit split a real possibility.192 The 
time is now for the Court to issue a modern opinion regarding the 
Contracts Clause and whether its once sacrosanct nature should be 
afforded protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.193 The Great Depression 
decidedly called for significant measures through New Deal era 
reform.194 However, the measures permitted under the guise of state 
police power and the emergency powers doctrine cannot erode the 
relevance of the Contracts Clause any longer.195 The permanent effect 
such measures had on the validity of the Contracts Clause would not 
have stood if taken in contravention of inviolable constitutional 
provisions, like the First Amendment.196 
By agreeing to weigh in on the circuit split, the Court would have 
the opportunity to set forth an appropriate, modern approach to 
protecting individual contract rights while also respecting the ability 
 
 191. See Elliott, 876 F.3d at 932 (providing reasons as to why the Seventh 
Circuit did not have to address the circuit split).  
 192. See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1821 (2018) (“We granted 
certiorari . . . to resolve a split of authority over whether the Contracts Clause prevents 
a revocation-on-divorce law from applying to a pre-existing agreement’s beneficiary 
designation.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Sibilla, supra note 2 (explaining 
how the Court’s decision to hear Contracts Clause case was shocking). 
 193. See Leef, supra note 126 (discussing how the Marshall Court held the 
Contracts Clause in a high regard).  
 194. See Belknap, supra note 63, at 108 (discussing the diverging path the 
legal community took under the New Deal). 
 195. See id. at 67 (“Fifty years after Franklin D. Roosevelt launched the New 
Deal, politicians are still debating programs that he initiated during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s.”); Lash, supra note 3, at 459–60 (“Finally, in 1937, a single 
justice changed his vote and a new majority of the Supreme Court initiated the modern 
tradition of judicial deference to economic and social welfare legislation. Some 
aspects of the story are still debated, including whether the New Deal was a 
‘constitutional moment’ and whether the Court’s shift in doctrine was triggered by 
external political events or an internal evolution of doctrine.”). 
 196. See Leef, supra note 126 (“Just imagine if the First Amendment had been 
treated that way, giving the government wide latitude to censor or punish free 
speech . . . .”).  
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of the states to regulate via their police power.197 The time is ripe to 
limit the scope of the states’ all-important police power by returning 
to one key aspect of Lochner era judicial and economic thought 
concerning individual contract rights.198 Namely, the return would 
mean allowing individuals the contractual freedom to make them 
arbiters of their adequate protection.199  
Relatedly, striking a proper balance requires determining what 
interests deserve protection under principles of freedom of contract 
and what constitutional standard of review those interests should 
receive.200 In doing so, the Court also has the opportunity to expand 
the broad role of § 1983.201 The Court can resolve the circuit split by 
demonstrating that individual freedom of contract is a fundamental 
liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, thus 
firmly supporting a cause of action under § 1983.202 
A. Balancing Individual and State Interests with a Clear Standard of 
Review 
The Contracts Clause shields against retroactive application of 
state law that affects the validity of pre-existing contractual 
 
 197. See Weber, supra note 46, at 57–58 (explaining the tension at issue in 
resolving the scope of the individual right to contract and determining how broad the 
contours are of government restriction of contract).  
 198. See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 49, at 7–10 
(discussing how revisionist academics have debunked the view that Lochner era 
Justices were proponents of Social Darwinism).  
 199. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (“There is no 
reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free 
contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. There is no 
contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to men in 
other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and 
care for themselves without the protecting arm of the state . . . .”); Bernstein, Lochner 
Era Revisionism, supra note 49, at 8–9 (discussing how Justice Holmes, one of the 
biggest anti-Lochner Justices, was actually the biggest supporter of free market 
economics).  
 200. See Leitch, supra note 88, at 188–89 (discussing the subtle difference in 
meaning between freedom to contract, freedom from contract, and liberty to contract).  
 201. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 3.03 (“[Section] 1983 has been utilized 
to litigate a broad spectrum of constitutional claims, including First Amendment 
rights, Fourth Amendment rights, due process and equal protection rights, and the 
rights of privacy, travel, and the right to vote.”). 
 202. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (discussing how 
the concept of liberty should be broadly defined); see also Dennis v. Higgins, 498 
U.S. 439, 444–45 (1991) (explaining the legislative purpose of § 1983 was to ensure 
a cause of action for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
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agreements.203 To properly insulate against state actors acting under 
the guise of police power to deny freedom of contract rights, the Court 
must provide a clear standard of review.204 As outlandish as it may 
sound to constitutional law scholars around the country, the proper 
standard lies within the text of the Lochner decision itself.205 
The Constitution does not guarantee an absolute right to 
contract.206 This proclamation has endured since the Great Depression 
and provides a hard outer limit on the freedom of contract via the 
state’s police power.207 Settling the circuit split would give the Court 
the opportunity to achieve the proper balance between the Contracts 
Clause and state police power by way of a clear standard of review.208 
To be sure, the standard of review needed to elucidate the proper 
balance is the constitutional standard of review and not the standard 
used to determine whether a state has retroactively impaired a 
contractual right.209  
In assessing freedom of contract claims, the Court most often 
applies a rational basis review.210 Application of a rational basis 
standard often means the regulation interfering with the contract is 
 
 203. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 262 (1827) (“It is thus most 
apparent, that, whichever way we turn, whether to laws affecting the validity, 
construction, or discharges of contracts, or the evidence or remedy to be employed in 
enforcing them, we are met by this overruling and admitted distinction, between those 
which operate retrospectively, and those which operate prospectively. In all of them, 
the law is pronounced to be void in the first class of cases, and not so in the second.”). 
 204. See Begakis, supra note 94, at 60–61 (discussing how the Constitution 
provides no protection against arbitrary violations of the freedom of contact).  
 205. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56–57 (1905) (setting forth a 
quasi-strict-scrutiny standard of review); see also Strauss, supra note 49, at 373 
(discussing the general unlikelihood of citing Lochner for support in a court brief).  
 206. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) 
(upholding a minimum wage law for women in the public interest); Home Bldg. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444–45 (1934) (upholding a Minnesota 
mortgage moratorium under the emergency powers doctrine).  
 207. See Bernstein, Freedom of Contract, supra note 41, at 7 (discussing how 
the Court’s previous libertarian approach to interpreting constitutional liberties was 
unsustainable during the pressures of the Great Depression).  
 208. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 
(1955) (describing a relaxed rational basis standard of review). 
 209. See, e.g., Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434–35 (explaining the rational basis for 
imposing a mortgage moratorium is the ability of the states to protect the interests of 
their constituency). Cf. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 
U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983) (describing the standard applicable to claim deprivation of a 
contractual right).  
 210. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
(1938) (discussing the rational basis test applied in economic rights cases).  
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presumptively valid.211 In limited instances where one of the 
contracting parties is a protected class deprived arbitrarily and 
capriciously of their personal liberty, the Court has elevated its 
analysis to an intermediate standard of review.212 However, the Court 
has seemingly declined to evaluate freedom of contract claims using 
the same constitutional scrutiny it would for other fundamentally 
protected rights.213 The Court’s approval of state police power 
measures taken in the aftermath of the Great Depression somehow 
admonished Lochner-era Court decisions for adherence to laissez-
faire economics, as well as for many of the era’s tenable opinions, 
including its reverence for freedom of contract.214  
Undoubtedly, progressive academics still have doubts regarding 
whether Lochner era decisions contain any precedential value.215 
However, the Court has substantially reversed course on its 
admonishment of the Lochner era in the past.216 The Griswold v. 
Connecticut decision recognizing fundamental rights implicit in the 
Bill of Rights, specifically privacy, relied primarily on Lochner and 
its progeny for support.217 The Griswold Court was reluctant to strike 
down state anti-contraception laws directly, following the logic of the 
Lochner decision.218 Nevertheless, the Court was implicating Lochner 
because it recognized that even fundamental unenumerated rights 
 
 211. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487–88 (explaining the requirements under 
a rational basis standard of review); see also Leitch, supra note 88, at 197–98 
(explaining that the government nearly always “wins” under a rational basis review).  
 212. See Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4 (discussing the 
instances where the constitutional standard of review may be elevated).  
 213. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (recognizing a 
liberty interest for the freedom of contract under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 214. See Bernstein, The Story of Lochner, supra note 94, at 331 (discussing 
how liberal scholars have recognized Lochner as simply a misstep); WHITE, supra 
note 91, at 201–02 (suggesting the shift in constitutional scrutiny was not a result of 
the FDR’s Court-packing plan or a response to the political conditions). 
 215. See Ely, supra note 32, at 393–94 (explaining the political trend toward 
government regulation of economic measures).  
 216. See Bernstein, The Story of Lochner, supra note 94, at 329–30 
(explaining the Court relied on the civil liberties decisions of the Lochner era in 
announcing privacy as a fundamental unenumerated right). 
 217. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (discussing the 
source of unenumerated fundamental rights).  
 218. See id. at 482 (explaining that the Court declined to use the Lochner v. 
New York decision as the basis to strike down a Connecticut law preventing the use 
of contraception). 
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require protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.219  
The key for claimants asserting a retroactive infringement of 
their contractual freedom is to demonstrate to the Court what the 
change in judicial thought between the Lochner v. New York and West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish decisions stood for on a practical level.220 
Namely, the claimant must demonstrate that the Parrish decision was 
not disapproving of laissez-faire economics, or a condemnation of 
freedom of contract principles, but rather a reactionary change based 
on the current economic, political, and legal landscape.221 A petitioner 
who is able to successfully illustrate this claim will have opened the 
door to restoring freedom of contract principles under either an 
intermediate or quasi-strict scrutiny standard of review.222  
Moreover, a plaintiff asserting that freedom to contract is a 
fundamental right can potentially offer a simpler explanation 
concerning why the Court provided deferential treatment to the police 
power and the emergency powers doctrine.223 The majority in Home 
Building & Loan v. Blaisdell interpreted the Contracts Clause as 
having the ability to change under the unique economic conditions of 
the Great Depression.224 A plaintiff asserting a state regulation violated 
his or her existing contractual rights under the Contracts Clause should 
 
 219. See Bernstein, The Story of Lochner, supra note 94, at 329–30 (“By 
resurrecting the Lochnerian notion that due process protects fundamental 
unenumerated rights, the Griswold Court ensured that many of the great constitutional 
issues of the last forty years would be decided as Due Process cases, rather than being 
decided based on notions of equality under the Equal Protection Clause or even left 
to the political branches to sort out.”). 
 220. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) 
(acknowledging that freedom of contract must be balanced against the rightful 
exercise of state police power); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1905) 
(recognizing that the freedom of contract must be balanced against the exercise of 
police power). 
 221. See Parrish, 300 U.S. at 390 (discussing that one of the reasons that it 
agreed to grant certiorari was to consider changed circumstances in light of 
contemporary economic conditions); see also WHITE, supra note 91, at 202–03 
(rejecting the hypothesis that the Court changed its jurisprudence based on 
Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan).  
 222. See Bernstein, The Story of Lochner, supra note 94, at 301 (explaining 
that Lochner era court decisions focused on carefully scrutinizing both economic 
rights and other unenumerated fundamental rights).  
 223. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442 (1934) 
(describing the tension between the Contracts Clause and the public welfare). 
 224. See WHITE, supra note 91, at 213 (explaining that Justice Hughes was 
attempting to reconcile textualism and originalism with the notion that the 
Constitution is a living document). 
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demonstrate that the Blaisdell Court was at pains to square the states’ 
police power with adherence to the text of a constitutional provision.225 
The vast majority of the constitutional provisions disavowed by the 
Court out of concern for the public welfare were the most litigated 
provisions prior to the New Deal.226 Notably, the First Amendment 
was not the revered constitutional provision as it is today during the 
New Deal era.227 Nevertheless, the First Amendment now enjoys a 
position of constitutional significance such that even laws with 
noteworthy public support consistently violate the civil liberties 
recognized in the First Amendment.228 Put another way, Justices of all 
political persuasions have adhered to championing the First 
Amendment in a “preferred position” and have analyzed legislation, 
economic or otherwise, under a strict scrutiny standard.229  
The Court’s task of balancing the First Amendment and the 
public welfare during the New Deal era produced a different result 
than balancing the Contracts Clause and the public welfare.230 That is, 
the First Amendment enjoys strong constitutional protection; 
however, even this sacrosanct individual liberty has limits.231 For 
example, the Court has consistently supported time, place, and manner 
restrictions as a permissible restraint on the preferred constitutional 
 
 225. See id. at 214 (“[A] recognition that judges, in interpreting the 
Constitution, might discover that the practical meaning of a constitutional provision 
had changed did not in itself provide a justification for concluding that the provision 
could be ignored.”).  
 226. See Strauss, supra note 49, at 376 (“During the Lochner era, the only 
constitutional principles that the Supreme Court enforced regularly and systematically 
were those that the New Deal discredited: freedom of contract . . . .”).  
 227. See id. at 376 (discussing the undeveloped nature of First Amendment 
jurisprudence during the New Deal era). 
 228. See id. at 377 (“The First Amendment is a particularly clear example. The 
Supreme Court, and the lower courts, regularly invalidate legislation and other official 
action, including quite important and popular legislation, on First Amendment 
grounds.”).  
 229. See Kessler, supra note 74, at 1918–19 (quoting Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943)) (discussing the “preferred position” 
occupied by the First Amendment).  
 230. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934) 
(explaining the balance between individual rights in the Contracts Clause and public 
emergency). 
 231. See C.J.S., supra note 80, § 957 (“While the content of communication 
enjoys virtually absolute First Amendment protection, the manner of communication 
does not.”). 
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status of freedom of speech.232 The state legislature can regulate the 
manner in which individuals convey their messages, and such 
regulation does not offend the First Amendment.233 Nonetheless, limits 
exist regarding Congress’s legislative abilities when regulating 
protected speech.234  
If a regulation crosses the threshold into policing the content of 
the speech, the regulation no longer serves the public welfare.235 
Similarly, as with all cases concerning constitutional rights, when the 
several states exercise police power they must treat each individual 
uniformly with respect to the aspect of the public welfare they are 
trying to regulate.236 Simply put, this illustration is in an effort to 
demonstrate the Court’s ability to successfully balance freedom of 
speech claims with police power—namely, through its time, place, 
and manner restrictions.237  
Moreover, the Court would be remiss if it did not recognize the 
irrational nature of citing Blaisdell, a case decided on the basis of 
exigent circumstances, when deciding future Contracts Clause 
cases.238 Perhaps the current Court recognizes the unique nature of the 
Blaisdell decision.239 However, the Court’s view remains unclear 
because it did not conduct a complete Contracts Clause analysis in 
 
 232. See id. (maintaining time, place, and manner restrictions must be 
narrowly tailored but not necessarily the least restrictive means of accomplishing an 
end).  
 233. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (“If a municipality 
has authority to control the use of its public streets for parades or processions, as it 
undoubtedly has, it cannot be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair 
discrimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other proper uses of the 
streets.”).  
 234. See C.J.S., supra note 80, § 957 (explaining that time, place, and manner 
restrictions are applicable to the manner and not the content of protected speech).  
 235. See Cox, 312 U.S. at 575–76 (explaining that regulations affecting the 
time, place, and manner of speech must be grounded in some aspect of protecting the 
public welfare).  
 236. See id. (discussing the need for a systematic approach when adjudicating 
freedom of speech claims). 
 237. See id. (demonstrating competing concerns of public welfare and free 
speech).  
 238. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447–48 (1934) 
(explaining that the Minnesota statute placing a moratorium on mortgage contracts 
did not violate the Contracts Clause). 
 239. See, e.g., Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1830–31 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting his belief that the Court does not fully appreciate the 
implications of Blaisdell). 
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Sveen.240 If the Court is to resolve the circuit split, it must recognize 
the irrational disconnect post-Lochner era courts have created.241 
Specifically, the Court must question why it reviews First Amendment 
claims under strict scrutiny but does not evaluate Contracts Clause 
claims in the same manner simply because of the government’s 
interest in overseeing economic measures.242  
An elevated standard of review does not mean the states’ police 
power is not deserving of respect.243 Instead, it would be prudent for 
the Court to analyze the Lochner decision for what it contributed in 
terms of a workable constitutional standard of review.244 The majority 
in Lochner argued that state police power should not be able to stand 
simply on a blank assertion of protecting the health, morals, safety, 
and welfare of the general public.245 The Court posited that 
government regulation that interferes with pre-existing contractual 
rights requires the government to justify its specific interests related 
to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.246 If the intent of the 
state police power is public protection, should the standard not 
carefully scrutinize which measure best accomplishes that end?247  
At its very best, the Court’s decision in Lochner offers a quasi-
strict scrutiny standard that can be adapted to balance the practical 
 
 240. See id. at 1822 (majority opinion) (explaining that a contractual 
relationship was not present between respondent and decedent’s insurance company).  
 241. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448–49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (discussing 
his belief that the Court’s reasoning was flawed). 
 242. See, e.g., Cox, 312 U.S. at 574 (stating the balance between the “public 
convenience” and otherwise facially absolute constitutional provisions); Blaisdell, 
290 U.S. at 442 (discussing the rational compromise struck between individual rights 
and the public welfare).  
 243. See Weber, supra note 46, at 56–58 (discussing how fundamental 
freedom of contract should ideally be in step with state police power).  
 244. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (discussing the balance 
the Court deemed appropriate between freedom of contract and state police power). 
 245. See id. at 57–58 (“The mere assertion that the subject relates though but 
in a remote degree to the public health does not necessarily render the enactment valid. 
The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must 
be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes 
with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to 
contract . . . .”).  
 246. See id. at 57 (arguing that regulating the ability of bakers to choose their 
own hours has not been proven as a compelling government interest in furtherance of 
health, safety, morals, and welfare). 
 247. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (arguing 
that liberty is limited by the police power and should be reviewed using a lax rational 
basis standard).  
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implications of the public’s well-being.248 If the Court determined that 
a government measure infringing on the freedom of contract was a 
fair, appropriate, and reasonable exercise of police power after careful 
scrutiny, arguments asserting the police power had not furthered the 
public interest would be to no avail.249 Nevertheless, an individual 
cannot properly safeguard his or her freedom of contract liberty 
without the Court sustaining a cause of action for the contractual 
damages he or she may have suffered.250 Deprivation of contractual 
liberty is a constitutional rights deprivation action under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.251  
B. Identifying the Scope of § 1983 
The Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape undoubtedly increased 
the amount of civil rights litigation protecting liberty interests under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.252 Similarly, the decisions that followed 
Monroe have largely worked to define the scope of just how broad 
those claims should be.253 Nevertheless, much confusion still exists 
concerning the scope of § 1983 because state provisions protecting 
deprivation of constitutional rights have not been interpreted in line 
with Monell.254  
 
 248. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56–57 (arguing that a quasi-strict scrutiny 
standard is not the judicial branch substituting its wisdom for the legislative branch).  
 249. See id. at 58 (arguing that after application of the quasi-strict scrutiny 
standard, the limit of state police power had been exceeded).  
 250. See Beermann, supra note 24, at 33 (“In the categories of cases in which 
section 1983 provides the only realistic substantive claim on the merits, it is of course 
more likely to be successful than any alternatives.”). 
 251. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (promulgating a civil action for deprivation 
of rights).  
 252. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 724 (1978) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (“The decision in Monroe v. Pape was the fountainhead of the torrent 
of civil rights litigation . . . .”); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (“But the 
purposes were much broader. The third aim was to provide a federal remedy where 
the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice.”) (emphasis 
omitted); see also Sunstein, supra note 136, at 396 (“Whether a private right of action 
is available for statutory violations under section 1983 is a question of enormous 
practical significance.”). 
 253. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (“We 
conclude that the Court of Appeals’ decision cannot be squared with our recognition 
that, in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to impose liability on a municipality 
unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself is the ‘moving force’ 
behind the plaintiffs deprivation of federal rights.”). 
 254. See, e.g., Robinson v. Solano Cty., 218 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“However, California has rejected the Monell rule, under which a county may be held 
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The Court has a strong incentive to resolve the circuit split in 
order to define the scope of § 1983 when the government body 
infringing freedom of contract is a municipal or other local 
government actor.255 Because courts interpreting state law have not 
interpreted municipal liability in the same manner the Court did in 
Monell, those asserting a deprivation of a constitutional right in state 
court have no grounds to assert an enforceable action under § 1983.256 
While it is true that in limited instances courts interpreting state laws 
have held municipalities liable under a common law theory of 
respondeat superior,257 the respondeat superior method of liability does 
nothing for those claimants asserting deprivation of constitutionally 
protected rights, such as the freedom of contract in state court.258  
While the award of attorney’s fees and uncapped compensatory 
damages are beneficial to a private litigant, they certainly do not 
provide an incentive for the Court to clarify the scope of § 1983.259 
Rather, the Court should hear a Contracts Clause claim under § 1983 
because strong inconsistencies exist between state constitutional 
provisions protecting rights through vicarious liability and federal law 
imposing liability on municipal offenders only when acting under 
well-established policy.260 However, such disconnect will continue 
 
liable in a § 1983 suit only if it has adopted an illegal or unconstitutional policy or 
custom. California holds counties liable for acts of their employees under the doctrine 
of respondeat superior . . . .”); Washington v. Robertson Cty., 29 S.W.3d 466, 475 
(Tenn. 2000) (“However, unlike the specific language and history of the federal 
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Tennessee’s statute . . . does not contain language that could 
be construed to limit a government liability to acts in furtherance of a policy or 
custom.”). 
 255. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (maintaining a municipal body is not liable 
simply for employing a tortfeasor under a theory of respondeat superior).  
 256. See id. (rejecting the compatibility of vicarious liability principles of 
respondeat superior with holding a governing body liable for a deprivation of federal 
rights).  
 257. See, e.g., Robinson, 218 F.3d at 1038 (holding a municipality liable for 
the actions of its employees). 
 258. See Crump v. Corr. Med. Servs., 647 F. Supp. 2d 375, 379 (D. Del. 2009) 
(“Because liability in a § 1983 claim cannot be based on respondeat superior or 
vicarious liability, a corporation under contract with the state . . . cannot be held liable 
for the acts of its employees and agents under those theories.”). 
 259. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2018) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow 
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part 
of the costs . . . .”).  
 260. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (explaining municipalities should only be 
held liable to the extent individuals are conducting themselves in accordance with a 
formally approved policy). Cf. Robinson, 218 F.3d at 1037–38 (holding local 
government units in California liable under theory of respondeat superior).  
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until the Court rationalizes that a Contracts Clause claim deprives a 
plaintiff of a constitutionally fundamental right.261 When a state actor 
deprives an individual of a First Amendment right, such as freedom of 
religion, that individual possesses a liberty interest that warrants a due 
process hearing.262 The most common remedy sought by freedom of 
religion claimants is a judicial determination as to whether state action 
abridging their freedom meets strict constitutional muster.263 Yet, 
somehow the Carter Court rationalized classifying the protections of 
the Contracts Clause as insubstantial based on the very same remedy 
sought: a judicial determination of rights.264  
The Court could resolve the circuit split if it were to mesh the 
protections against retroactive state inference with contracts—which 
allegedly remain the only rights conferred by the Contracts Clause—
with the general right of an individual to contract, which was explicitly 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.265 By thoroughly 
explaining the anomaly and rectifying it by incorporating the 
Contracts Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will have 
the opportunity to resolve additional constitutional issues involving 
the Contract Clause.266 Namely, the Court can define an appropriate 
standard of review and hone in on a suitable scope of § 1983 as it 
relates to local government liability when individuals implicate it in 
freedom-of-contract disputes.267 
 
 261. See Kalscheur, supra note 144, at 178 (discussing the incongruity of the 
Carter decision).  
 262. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (explaining that 
freedom of religion is fundamental liberty interest).  
 263. See Kalscheur, supra note 144, at 178 (“A person claiming a violation of 
the [F]irst or [F]ourteenth [A]mendment seeks to have the offending statute declared 
invalid as well.”).  
 264. See Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1885) (arguing that the 
Contracts Clause provides only indirect and incidental rights). 
 265. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (describing the right 
of the individual to contract as a recognized Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest); 
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 262 (1827) (explaining that the Contracts Clause 
affords rights to only those state laws that retroactively affect contracts). 
 266. See Carter, 114 U.S. at 322 (discussing how the Contracts Clause lacks 
security in the Constitution); see also Collins, supra note 189, at 1503 (discussing the 
odd nature of Contracts Clause jurisprudence).  
 267. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (explaining 
that municipalities are liable to the extent individuals are conducting themselves in 
accordance with a formally approved policy). 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court should adopt the view that 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil cause of action for a state violation of 
the Contracts Clause of Constitution.268 The Court’s decision in Carter 
v. Greenhow makes clear that its limitation of Contracts Clause 
protections were based strictly on omissions in the plaintiff’s 
pleading.269 In actuality, the Court in Carter never explicitly stood for 
the proposition that a Contracts Clause deprivation claimant could not 
seek redress in § 1983.270 Thus, the circuits have erroneously 
perpetuated an anomaly—for at least the past twenty years—in a 
manner that has affected the ability of private individuals to be secure 
in their full gamut of the constitutional liberties.271 By ruling that             
§ 1983 provides a cause of action for a violation of the Contracts 
Clause, the Court can establish that the public welfare can be furthered 
by recognizing the clear meaning of the Contracts Clause.272 Allowing 
Contracts Clause claims under § 1983 will provide individuals with 
the right vehicle for asserting deprivations of what was previously a 
sacrosanct fundamental individual right: the freedom of contract.273 
 
 
 268. See generally S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (suggesting the Supreme Court implied Contracts Clause claims are 
actionable under § 1983 in Dennis v. Higgins); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 
3.03 (“The author believes the better view is that the contract clause is enforceable 
under § 1983. The Carter language that the contract clause secures rights ‘only 
indirectly and incidentally’ is simply not accurate.”). 
 269. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 450–51 n.9 (1991) (discussing the 
precedential significance of Carter). 
 270. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 3.03 (noting that the significance of the 
Dennis decision is that the Court suggested, in dicta, that it would have found a 
Contracts Clause claim cognizable under § 1983). 
 271. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 403 (1923) (discussing the 
right of the individual to contract as one of the select few Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty interests). 
 272. See WHITE, supra note 91, at 214 (explaining that a constitutional 
provision requires balancing with the public welfare). 
 273. See Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 121 (1896) (discussing the 
Contracts Clause’s once prominent role in protecting the freedom of contract). 
